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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-PUBLIC TEACHER'S
RIGHT TO SPEAK IN FAVOR OF HOMOSEXUALITY-National Gay
Task Force v. Board of Education of the City of Oklahoma City
- In October of 1980, the National Gay Task Force (hereafter
NGTF), a national homosexual rights advocacy organization
whose membership includes teachers in the Oklahoma public
school system, brought an action in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma challenging the fa-
cial constitutional validity of an Oklahoma statute which pro-
vided for the dismissal or suspension of teachers in Oklahoma
public school systems for engaging in "public homosexual con-
duct." The suit was brought by NGTF as a class action on be-
half of all teachers prospectively and presently employed by the
Board of Education of the City of Oklahoma City.2
In the district court case,3 NGTF challenged the constitu-
tionality of the state statute, 70 O.S. § 6-103.15, claiming that it
1. National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education of the City of Oklahoma City, 729
F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985).
2. 729 F.2d at 1272.
3. National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education, Oklahoma City, 33 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1009 (W.D.Okla. 1982).
4. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 6-103.15, which reads:
A. As used in this section:
1. 'Public homosexual activity' means the commission of an act defined in
Section 886 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes, if such act is:
a. committed with a person of the same sex, and
b. indiscreet and not practiced in private;
2. 'Public homosexual conduct' means advocating, soliciting, imposing, en-
couraging or promoting public or private homosexual activity in a manner that
creates a substantial risk that such conduct will come to the attention of school
children or school employees; and
3. 'Teacher' means a person as defined in Section 1-116 of Title 70 of the
Oklahoma Statutes.
B. In addition to any ground set forth in Section 6-103 of Title 70 of the
Oklahoma Statutes, a teacher, student teacher or a teachers' aide may be refused
employment, or reemployment, dismissed, or suspended after a finding that the
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interfered with plaintiff's members' right of free speech.' The
district court held that NGTF had failed to demonstrate that
the act was unconstitutional on its face and rendered judgment
for the Board of Education.'
NGTF appealed the district court decision and in National
Gay Task Force v. Board of Education of the City of Oklahoma
City,7 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the
district court decision, holding, in part, that the portion of the
statute which provided punishment for the mere advocacy of ho-
mosexual activity was unconstitutionally overbroad."
The Oklahoma City Board of Education appealed the court
of appeals' decision to the Supreme Court.9 At its October 1,
1984 session, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in
teacher or teachers' aide has:
1. Engaged in public homosexual conduct or activity; and
2. Has been rendered unfit, because of such conduct or activity, to hold
a position as a teacher, student teacher or teachers' aide.
C. The following factors will be considered in making the determination
whether the teacher, student teacher or teachers' aide has been rendered unfit
for his position:
1. The likelihood that the activity or conduct may adversely affect the stu-
dents or school employees;
2. The proximity in time or place of the activity or conduct to the
teacher's, student teacher's or teachers' aide's official duties;
3. Any extenuating or aggravating circumstances; and
4. Whether the conduct or activity is of a repeated or continuing nature
which tends to encourage or dispose school children toward similar conduct or
activity."
Id. at 1010.
5. 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1010. NGTF alleged that the statute is uncon-
stitutional because "it interferes with plaintiffs right of free speech; it is vague and over-
broad; it interferes with plaintiff's members' right of privacy; it violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause; and, it violates plaintiff's right to freedom of religion." Id.
6. Id. at 1017. The district court noted that the plaintiff "challenges the facial valid-
ity of the statute. Therefore, no set of facts is presented to this court." Id. at 1010.
7. 729 F.2d 1270.
8. Id. at 1270. The court of appeals agreed with the district court in holding that "(1)
there was no constitutional problem in [the] statute's permitting [a] teacher to be fired
for engaging in 'public homosexual activity'; (2) [the] statute's definition of 'public ho-
mosexual activity' was not unconstitutionally vague; (3) [the statute's] classification
based on choice of sexual partners was not subject to 'strict scrutiny' equal protection
analysis." The court further held that the "unconstitutional portion of [the] statute was
severable from that portion which constitutionally proscribed public homosexual activ-
ity." Id.
9. 729 F.2d 1270, petition for rev. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3103 (U.S. Aug. 14, 1984) (No.
83-2030).
COMMENTS
the direct appeal filed by the state.'" The questions presented to
the Supreme Court, on appeal, were:
(1) Does [the] state statute on its face unconstitutionally in-
fringe upon protected free speech rights of public school
teachers;
(2) Is [the] statute so facially overbroad as to infringe upon
protected free speech rights of public school teachers; and
(3) Can [the] statute be so narrowly construed as to uphold its
constitutionality?"
In a decision announced on March 26, 1985, the Supreme Court,
by a 4-4 vote in which Justice Powell took no part, affirmed the
judgment of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 2
This comment will review the background of the Oklahoma
statute and the district court action in the original case. It will
then analyze the court of appeals' decision as to the constitu-
tional questions presented and how they were resolved, or not
resolved, and what significance the Supreme Court's 4-4 affirm-
ance will have for the State of Oklahoma, the states within the
Tenth Circuit and the lesbian and gay community in the United
States.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In April, 1978 the Oklahoma legislature enacted, as an addi-
tion to the section of the Oklahoma law providing for the dis-
missal of public school teachers, Oklahoma Statute, Title 70,
Section 6-103.15, which was known as the "Helm Statute."' 3 The
Oklahoma statute provided for the termination of "unfit" teach-
ers who advocate or encourage public or private homosexual
conduct.14 According to the language of the statute, a teacher
could be rendered unfit because of such conduct or activity.
15
"Public Homosexual Conduct," as used in this statute, was de-
10. 729 F.2d 1270, prob. juris. noted, 105 S. Ct. 76 (1984). The Supreme Court heard
oral arguments from Dennis Arrow, attorney for the Oklahoma City Board of Education,
and Laurence Tribe, representing the National Gay Task Force, on January 14, 1985. 53
U.S.L.W. 3521 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1985) (No. 83-2030).
11. 53 U.S.L.W. 3204 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1984) (No. 83-2030).
12. 105 S. Ct. 1161 (1985).
13. See supra note 4. Mary Helm was the Oklahoma legislator who first introduced
the measure.
14. 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1010.
15. See supra note 4, § 6-103.15(B)(2).
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fined as "advocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or pro-
moting public or private homosexual activity in a manner that
creates a substantial risk that such conduct will come to the at-
tention of school children or school employees."16 The law had
been enacted at the urging of Anita Bryant, a former Miss
Oklahoma, who was traveling across the country at the time to
advocate anti-homosexual legislation.17 Oklahoma was the only
state to pass such a statute. An attempt in California to pass a
similar law was defeated in 1978.18
II. DISTRICT COURT DECISION
The National Gay Task Force, a national membership or-
ganization for gay and lesbian rights advocacy, was concerned
that as the act prohibited "public homosexual conduct" it would
therefore punish teachers and other school system employees for
participating in organizations or political campaigns in which
gay rights was an issue.19 NGTF claims among its membership
both present and prospective homosexual teachers employed by
16. See supra note 4, § 6-103.15(A)(2). In its brief to the Supreme Court, the
Oklahoma City Board of Education argued that "Teacher advocacy of criminal homosex-
ual activity ... when it comes to the attention of other teachers or co-workers is likely to
produce sufficient controversy, suspicion, and mistrust so as to threaten employee disci-
pline, co-worker harmony, and that personal loyalty and confidence requisite to particu-
larly close employee relationships." Brief for Appellant, at 34-35.
17. See generally, Anita, Gays Have Their Say in Separate Capitol Events,
Oklahoma City Times, Feb. 21, 1978, at 1, and Anita's Plea to Senate: Don't Legislate
Immorality, Daily Oklahoman, Feb. 22, 1978, at 1. The Oklahoma statute was part of a
nationwide wave of anti-gay activism led by Anita Bryant and the "Save Our Children"
campaign. Ms. Bryant urged the passage of the statute to stop the "flaunting of homo-
sexuality" and to protect school children from those who "profess homosexuality." Brief
for Appellee, at 3.
18. In November, 1978, California voters had on their ballots a similar statute, Pro-
position 6, which had been sponsored by State Senator John Briggs and was known as
the Briggs Initiative. If this controversial proposition had been approved, it would have
required the firing of all California public school teachers who engaged in homosexual
activity or homosexual conduct. Homosexual conduct was defined as "advocating, solicit-
ing, imposing, encouraging or promoting private or public homosexual activity." Proposi-
tion 6 reprinted at CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL VOTERS HANDBOOK 28-31 (1978). Ronald Reagan,
a private citizen at the time, wrote in his newspaper column just before election day that
the definition of conduct-especially the undefined word advocacy-generated heavy bi-
partisan opposition to the measure and that he too was opposed. Reagan, Two Ill-ad-
vised California Trends, L.A. Herald Examiner, Nov. 1, 1978, at A-19.




the Oklahoma City school district.20 Thus, NGTF brought a
class action on behalf of those teachers challenging the statute,
alleging that the statute was facially unconstitutional because "it
interferes with plaintiff's members' right of free speech; it is
vague and overbroad; it interferes with plaintiff's members' right
of privacy; it violates the equal protection clause; and it violates
plaintiff's right to freedom of religion."21
The district court held that NGTF had failed to demon-
strate that the Oklahoma statute was unconstitutional on its
face and so denied plaintiff's motion for judgment.22 The court,
in reaching this decision, found that the statute does not affect
any speech protected by the first amendment,23 the statute is
not overbroad,24 nor is it unconstitutionally vague,25 the right of
privacy does not include the activities encompassed by the stat-
ute,2 the statute does not violate the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution because it is ra-
tionally related to a legitimate state goal,27 and the statute did
20. 729 F.2d at 1272.
21. 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1010.
22. Id. at 1017.
23. Id. at 1012. The court further found that the only "chilling" is caused by unrea-
sonable fear and that the statute did not constitute prior restraint of protected speech.
Id.
24. Id. at 1013. The court held that "the statute merely provides that a teacher may
be terminated if he engages in public homosexual conduct or activity and is found to be
unfit to teach because of that activity." Id.
25. Id. at 1013-14. Comparing this case to Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972), in which the Court held that the vagueness of the terms "noises and diversions"
was dispelled by the antinoise ordinance requirements, the district court held that the
unfitness requirement dispelled the vagueness of the terms "public homosexual activity"
and "public homosexual conduct." Id.
26. Id. at 1014. The court commented that the United States Supreme Court has not
specifically addressed the question whether the right of privacy extends to homosexual
activity. In spite of plaintiff's argument to extend the holding of the highest appellate
court of New York in People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981),
the court held that Onofre was not controlling "because the target statute condemns
public, not private, homosexual activity." 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1017.
27. Id. at 1015. The court outlined the appropriate standard of review to use in de-
termining whether a statute violated the equal protection clause, stating that "if the
statute does not affect a 'fundamental right' or 'suspect' classification it must merely be
shown to be rationally related to a legitimate state interest." The court said it was "clear
that homosexuals are not members of a protected class," that it was not "aware of any
court decision which has held homosexuals to be a suspect class," and that it was unwill-
ing to hold so itself in view of the Supreme Court's conservative stance regarding gender.
Since the statute did not affect a fundamental right or suspect class, the court held that
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not violate the establishment clause of the first amendment to
the Constitution. 8
At the close of the decision, District Judge Eubanks re-
marked that he felt many of the plaintiff's fears were unwar-
ranted.29 To support this claim, he listed a number of activities
for which he said the act would not allow a school board to dis-
charge, declare unfit or otherwise discipline teachers.8 0 He fur-
ther stated that if, under the act, a school board could declare a
teacher unfit for doing any of the listed activities, it would most
likely not meet constitutional muster. 1 Since the court found
that the protected expression was not hindered by the act, it
held that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the statute
was unconstitutional on its face and denied the motion for
judgment.
3 2
"the legislation need only bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest," and
that "it is clear that the legitimate state interest ... is the fitness of public school teach-
ers." The court further stated that the legislature's perception that public homosexual
conduct by a teacher might render him unfit to teach was "not a totally irrational per-
ception, or erroneous idea," and that "public homosexual activity likely would affect the
efficiency of a teacher." Accordingly, the court held that the statute "is rationally related
to a legitimate state goal." Id. at 1015-16.
28. Id. at 1017. The court based its decision on Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980),
holding that "it is not enough to show that a statute merely coincides with a religious
belief. There must also be [a] showing that the statute remains religious in nature." In
this case, "[t]he statute does indeed reflect some Christian beliefs while implementing
traditional values, but these things do not invalidate it." 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
at 1017.
29. Id.
30. Id. Judge Eubanks' examples included:
a. a heterosexual or homosexual teacher who merely advocates equality for
or tolerance of homosexuality;
b. a teacher who openly discusses homosexuality;
c. a teacher who assigns for class study articles and books written by advo-
cates of gay rights;
d. a teacher who expresses an opinion, publicly or privately, on the subject
of homosexuality; or
e. a teacher who advocates the enactment of laws establishing civil rights
for homosexuals.
Id.
31. Id. See also Gay Activists Alliance [GAA] v. Board of Regents of the University
of Oklahoma, 638 P.2d 1116 (Okla. 1981). In this case the GAA brought action against
the Regents for recognition as a student organization of the University. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court found that "it is no longer a valid argument to suggest that an organiza-
tion cannot be formed to peaceably advocate repeal of certain criminal laws." 638 P.2d at
1122 (quoting Gay Lib. v. University of Missouri, 558 F.2d 848, 856 n.16 (8th Cir. 1977)).
32. 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1017.
COMMENTS
III. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
Following the district court's decision upholding the consti-
tutionality of the statute, NGTF appealed the decision, restating
its contentions "that the statute violated plaintiff's members'
rights to privacy and equal protection, that it is void for vague-
ness, that it violated the establishment clause, and, finally, that
it was overbroad."33 In National Gay Task Force v. Board of
Education for the City of Oklahoma City,34 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, re-
versed the judgment of the district court, holding that the stat-
ute, "insofar as it punishes 'homosexual conduct,' as that phrase
is defined in the statute to include 'advocating... encouraging
or promoting public or private homosexual activity,' is unconsti-
tutional. '3 5 The court of appeals found that "the statute pros-
cribes protected speech and is thus facially overbroad." 36 Dis-
agreeing with the district court's opinion, the court of appeals




The court of appeals considered each of the plaintiff's con-
tentions individually, agreeing with the district court's findings
on a majority of the contentions yet disagreeing with the result
by holding that the portion of the statute which provided pun-
ishment for mere advocacy of homosexual activities was uncon-
stitutionally overbroad.3 8 The court further held that the uncon-
33. 729 F.2d at 1272.
34. 729 F.2d 1270, aff'd by an equally divided Court, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985).
35. Id. at 1275 (ellipsis in original).
36. Id. at 1272.
37. Id. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S.
503 (1969), the Court established that "where there is no finding and no showing that
engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially and substantially interfere with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,' the prohibition
cannot be sustained." 393 U.S. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th
Cir. 1966)). The district court had said that the "crucial question is whether the expres-
sion contemplated by the statute substantially or materially interferes with the operation
of the school. Only when substantial disruption is present is the employee's right of free
expression outweighed." The court ruled that "a teacher found unfit because of public
homosexual activity or conduct would cause a substantial and material disruption of the
school." 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1011-12.
38. 729 F.2d at 1274.
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stitutional portion of the statute was severable from that portion
which constitutionally proscribed public homosexual activity. 9
1. Constitutional Portions of the Statute
In holding that there was no constitutional problem in the
statute's permitting a teacher to be fired for engaging in "public
homosexual activity,"' 0 the court held that the plaintiff's citing
of Baker v. Wade"' and New York v. Onofre42 were inapplicable
to the present case.'3
Baker was a suit which attacked the constitutionality of the
Texas sodomy statute which condemned homosexual conduct
performed in private between consenting adults." The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas held
that the statute violated both the fundamental right of privacy
and the right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed to the
plaintiff and other homosexuals by the Constitution.3 The court
specifically stated that:
[H]omosexual conduct in private between consenting
adults is protected by a fundamental right of privacy.
Any state restriction upon that right must be justified by
some compelling state interest."
39. Id. at 1275.
40. Id. at 1273.
41. 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
42. 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
43. 729 F.2d at 1273. The court explained that "both of these cases held that the
Constitution protects consensual, non-commercial sexual acts in private between adults.
Baker and Onofre are inapplicable to the instant case." Id.
44. 553 F. Supp. at 1125.
45. Id. (In a 9-7 decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc reversed
the district court decision, thus upholding the constitutionality of Texas Penal Code §
21.06 which proscribes consensual homosexual activity. Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th
Cir.) (1985). A three judge panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had previously
rejected an appeal by Potter County District Attorney Danny Hill holding that Hill did
not have the right to intervene and prosecute the appeal. Baker v. Wade, 243 F.2d 236
(5th Cir. 1984) (vacated by the grant of an en banc hearing)).
46. 553 F. Supp. at 1141. The district court held that the right of privacy did extend
to private, voluntary, intimate relationships-between husband and wife, between un-




Onofre was an appeal of a conviction based on the consen-
sual sodomy statute of the State of New York.47 In affirming the
appellate division decision, the Court of Appeals of New York
extended the right of privacy to include homosexual acts as long
as the decisions to engage in such acts are voluntarily made by
adults in a noncommercial, private setting. '
The court of appeals in the present case interpreted the
holdings of both Baker and Onofre as applying constitutional
protection only to consensual, noncommercial sexual acts in pri-
vate between adults. The court held that since the Oklahoma
statute did not punish acts performed in private, the right of
privacy was not implicated. 9
In support of this position, the court cited Lovisi v. Slay-
ton"0 in which the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, cit-
ing to Roe v. Wade,51 held that the Constitution recognizes a
right of privacy with respect to those rights regarded as "funda-
mental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 5 2 The
court in Lovisi went on to hold that "the personal intimacies of
marriage, the home, procreation, motherhood, childbearing and
the family have been held fundamental by the Supreme Court
and, hence, have been encompassed within the protected rights
of privacy."53 In an addendum to its decision in Lovisi, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals cited Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney for the City of Richmond," holding that in Doe the
47. 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
48. Id. at 951.
49. 729 F.2d at 1273.
50. 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976). The Court affirmed the
conviction of a husband and wife who were serving a prison term for violating the Vir-
ginia sodomy statute, holding that "once a married couple admits strangers as onlookers
to acts of sexual intimacy the Federal protection of privacy dissolves." Plaintiffs had
admitted a third party into their bedroom and were thus found to be subject to prosecu-
tion and conviction under state sodomy law since the presence of the third party dis-
solved the expectation of privacy. Id.
51. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
52. 539 F.2d at 351.
53. Id. The court listed the Supreme Court decisions that established these funda-
mental rights. Id. at 351 n.3.
54. 403 F. Supp. 1199, aff'd, 425 U.S. 901, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976). Plain-
tiffs challenged the constitutionality of Virginia's sodomy statute as applied to a homo-
sexual's relations with another adult male, consensually and in private. In finding for the
defendant, the court held that the right of privacy extended only to the "privacy of the
incidents of marriage, upon the sanctity of the home, or upon the nurture of family life."
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Supreme Court necessarily confined the constitutionally pro-
tected right of privacy to heterosexual conduct.
55
The court of appeals in the instant case also held that the
district court correctly rejected the plaintiff's contention that
the statute was vague in regard to "public homosexual activ-
ity."56 NGTF had argued, in the district court, that the statute
was both overbroad and vague in that as it applies to all expres-
sion, it encompasses constitutionally protected activity, and the
terms "public homosexual conduct" and "public homosexual ac-
tivity" are not defined with sufficient specificity.
57
The district court held that the statute was not overbroad
because it "merely provided that a teacher may be terminated if
he engages in public homosexual conduct or activity and is
found to be unfit to teach because of that activity.""8 The dis-
trict court found that there was sufficient specificity in the terms
"public homosexual conduct" and "public homosexual activity,"
commenting that "a man of reasonable intelligence can certainly
view the statute and determine which acts he should avoid." 59
In affirming this portion of the district court's decision, the
court of appeals applied the test of facial overbreadth and
vagueness outlined in Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flip-
side, Hoffman Estates, Inc.60 The doctrine derived from that
case requires that a complainant demonstrate that the chal-
lenged law is impermissibly vague in all its applications.6 The
court of appeals held that NGTF had not demonstrated this in
the present case. In the court's view, Oklahoma laws construing
403 F. Supp. at 1200.
55. 539 F.2d at 352. The dissent, in Lovisi, commented, however, that the Supreme
Court's affirmance of Doe was only summary, and, while it is an adjudication on the
merits, the basis for the conclusion is obscure because it is unarticulated. Id. at 355.
56. 729 F.2d at 1273.
57. 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1012-13.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1014.
60. 455 U.S. 489 (1982). The Court held that in a facial challenge to the overbreadth
and vagueness of a law (here, a village ordinance regulating the sale of "drug parapher-
nalia"); the first task is "to determine whether the enactment reached a substantial
amount of constitutionally protected conduct." If not, the overbreadth challenge must
fail. The court should then examine the facial vagueness challenge and "uphold the chal-
lenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all its applications." Id. at 494-95.
61. Id. at 497.
[Vol. III
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the "crime against nature" statute clearly defined the acts the
statute proscribes.2
As to the plaintiff's contention that the statute violates its
members' right to equal protection under the law, both the dis-
trict court 63 and the court of appeals6'4 relied upon Frontiero v.
Richardson65 in determining the appropriate standard of review.
In Frontiero, a four justice plurality viewed sex as a suspect
statutory classification and therefore subject to close judicial
scrutiny.6 In the present case, the court held that since only
four members of the Supreme Court had viewed gender as a sus-
pect class, they could not find a classification on the basis of the
choice of sexual partners as suspect.67 In clarifying their posi-
tion, the court cited a footnote to the district court decision in
Baker. 8 In the footnote, the district court said that had the is-
sue been reached, the court would hold that homosexuals were
not a "suspect class" for equal protection purposes.69
Since the court in this case held that homosexuals are not a
suspect class, it stated that something less than strict scrutiny
should be applied in determining if there is an equal protection
violation. 0 Citing to the Supreme Court case of Amback v.
Norwick,7 which held that teachers have an obligation to pro-
62. 729 F.2d at 1273. The Court stated that OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 provides: "every
person who is guilty of the detestable and abominable crime against nature, committed
with mankind or with beast, is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary not ex-
ceeding ten years." In the historical note to the statute, the origin of this statute is the
Comp. Laws Dak. 1887, section 6547. Id. at 1273, n.1. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals
has held that the "Crime against nature" statute proscribes oral and anal copulation.
Berryman v. State, 283 P.2d 558, 563 (Okla.Cr.App. 1955).
63. 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1015.
64. 729 F.2d at 1273.
65. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In this case, a female member of the uniformed services
challenged the difference in treatment in spouse benefits for male members who auto-
matically claim their wives as "dependents" and female members who were required to
prove that their husbands were "dependents." The Supreme Court held that this classifi-
cation was discriminatory. Four justices held that sex was a suspect classification, with
three other justices supporting the result but finding it inappropriate to decide whether
sex is a suspect classification. Id.
66. Id. at 682.
67. 729 F.2d at 1273.
68. 553 F. Supp. at 1144 n.58.
'69. Id.
70. 729 F.2d at 1273.
71. 441 U.S. 68, 80 (1979). The Court upheld a New York State statute which forbade
permanent certification as a school teacher of any person who was not a United States
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mote civic virtues and function as an example for students, the
court in this case held that "surely a school may fire a teacher
for engaging in an indiscreet public act of oral or anal inter-
course."72 The district court found that a statute which concerns
public homosexual conduct was rationally related to a legitimate
state goals.7 The state interest which the statute seeks to further
is the fitness of its public school teachers.7 4 The court held that
public homosexual activity would be likely to affect the effi-
ciency of a teacher, and that the "teacher's efficiency is related
to the performance of his job and hence, his fitness to teach. '75
With one reference to Harris v. McRae 7 6 the court of ap-
peals agreed with the district court's rejection of NGTF's estab-
lishment clause claim.7 7 Plaintiff had contended, in the district
court case, that the Oklahoma statute violates the establishment
clause of the Constitution.7 8 This contention was based upon the
assertion that the statute is based upon Judeo-Christian be-
liefs.79 The district court held, however, that merely because a
law coincides with a religious belief does not make that law vio-
lative of the establishment clause. 0 The district court based its
holding on McGowan v. Maryland,8' in which the Supreme
Court said that the "Establishment Clause does not ban Federal
or State regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely
happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all
citizen unless that person had manifested an intention to apply for citizenship. Id.
72. 729 F.2d at 1273.
73. 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1016.
74. Id.
75. Id. In its brief to the Supreme Court, the Oklahoma City Board of Education
argued that, "given the significant 'role model' function which teachers are called upon
to perform, [teacher advocacy of criminal homosexual sodomy] is likely to engender dis-
respect for law as an institution, the social responsibilities of citizenship, and the politi-
cal governmental process as a whole." Brief for Appellant at 34.
76. 448 U.S. 297. In rejecting a challenge to the so-called Hyde Amendment (which
denied Federal Medicaid funding for abortions), the Court held that the funding restric-
tions violated neither the fifth amendment nor the establishment clause of the first
amendment. Id. at 326.
77. 729 F.2d at 1273.
78. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
79. 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1016.
80. Id.
81. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). This was a challenge to the Maryland "Blue" Laws which
prohibited specific activities on Sundays or limited them to certain hours, places or con-
ditions. The Supreme Court held that the challenged statute was not a law respecting an
establishment of religion. Id. at 452.
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religions. '82 The district court pointed out that McGowan was
applied in Harris v. McRae" with the result being that "it is not
enough to show that a statute merely coincides with a religious
belief," but that "the statute remains religious in nature. ' 84 It
was upon this holding that the court of appeals based its agree-
ment with the district court's rejection of NGTF's establishment
clause claim.
2. Unconstitutional Portion of the Statute
The court of appeals did find that the portion of the
Oklahoma statute that allows punishment of teachers for "pub-
lic homosexual conduct" does present constitutional problems.8 5
It specifically held that the statute's proscription of advocating,
encouraging or promoting homosexual activity is unconstitution-
ally overbroad. 6
In so doing, the court first acknowledged that the action was
brought as a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the stat-
ute and that such challenges based on first amendment over-
breadth arguments are "strong medicine" and should be used
"sparingly and only as a last resort. 8 7 In the present case, the
court of appeals held that invalidation of the statute would be
appropriate because the portion proscribing "public homosexual
conduct" is overbroad and not readily subject to a narrowing
construction."8 Citing Erzoznick v. City of Jacksonville," the
court further held that the statute's deterrent effect on legiti-
82. Id. at 442.
83. 448 U.S. at 319-20.
84. 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1017.
85. 729 F.2d at 1273.
86. Id. at 1274.
87. Id. The Supreme Court has also stated that it has not invoked facial overbreadth
when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged statute.
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1972).
88. 729 F.2d at 1274.
89. 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (An ordinance making it a public nuisance and a punishable
offense for a drive-in movie theater to exhibit films containing nudity, even though the
screen was visible from a public street or place, was facially invalid as an infringement of
the first amendment.) The Court followed the precedent in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 497 (1965) and Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 612-15, in holding that a
state statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a
narrowing construction by the state courts and unless its deterrent effect on legitimate
expression is both real and substantial. 422 U.S. at 216.
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mate expression is both real and substantial and not readily sub-
ject to a narrowing construction."0 The court pointed out that
when, as in this case, "pure speech" is regulated by statute, a
court must be especially willing to invalidate the challenged
statute."'
In finding that a portion of the Oklahoma statute was un-
constitutional, the court of appeals focused on the definition of
the term "public homosexual conduct"' 2 as contained in the
statute. This definition includes advocacy.93
The court clearly pointed out that the first amendment protects
"advocacy," even of illegal conduct, except when "advocacy" is
"directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action. "'4 The court also stated
that the first amendment does not permit punishment for advo-
cating illegal conduct at some indefinite future time.9
Encouraging and promoting were also included in the defi-
nition of "public homosexual conduct. 9 6 The court commented
that like "advocating," encouraging and promoting does not nec-
essarily imply incitement to immediate action. 7 One of the
90. 729 F.2d at 1274.
91. Id. Here, the court relied on a discussion of the application of overbreadth analy-
sis to "pure speech" as found in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), in which the
Supreme Court held that a New York statute prohibiting persons from knowingly pro-
moting a sexual performance by a child under the age of sixteen by distributing material
which depicts such a performance did not violate the first amendment. 458 U.S. at 772-
73. The Supreme Court in Ferber followed the precedent established in Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, which held that "particularly where conduct and not merely
speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real,
but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." 413
U.S. at 615.
92. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 6-103.15(A)(2) defines this as "advocating, soliciting, impos-
ing, encouraging, or promoting public or private homosexual activity in a manner that
creates a substantial risk that such conduct will come to the attention of school children
or school employees." See supra note 4.
93. Id.
94. 729 F.2d at 1274. In the case cited, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), the
Supreme Court further held that a statute which fails to draw the distinction impermis-
sibly intrudes on the freedoms guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. Id.
at 448.
95. 729 F.2d at 1274. Here, the Court relies on the Supreme Court decision in Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973), in which the Supreme Court held that a person's speech
could not be grounds for punishment because it had a "tendency to lead to violence."
414 U.S. at 109.
96. See supra note 4, at (A)(2).
97. 729 F.2d at 1274.
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plaintiff's primary reasons for bringing this suit was the fear
that a teacher advocating the repeal of anti-sodomy statutes
would fall into the area of speech proscribed by the statute's
definition.' The court held that such statements, which are
aimed at legal and social change, are at the core of first amend-
ment protections and should not be restricted. 9
In Erzoznick, the Supreme Court held that a state statute
should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily
subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts. 00 The
court of appeals held that the Oklahoma statute in the present
case is not easily susceptible to a narrowing construction because
the Oklahoma legislature chose the word "advocacy" despite the
Supreme Court's interpretation of that word in Brandenburg v.
Ohio.101
As stated earlier, the Supreme Court has held that one fac-
tor required in a facial challenge to a statute is that its deterrent
effect on legitimate expression is both real and substantial."0 '
The court in this case held that the effect of the Oklahoma stat-
ute is both real and substantial in that it applies to all teachers,
substitute teachers, and teacher's aides in Oklahoma who, in or-
der to protect their jobs, must restrict their expression.103
By finding that a proscription of advocacy has a real and
substantial effect on expression which was not subject to a nar-
rowing construction, the court held that the portion of the stat-
ute which "proscribes advocating, encouraging, or promoting ho-
mosexual activity is unconstitutionally overbroad."'
0 4
In finding for the Oklahoma City Board of Education in the
district court case, the lower court held that the statute
presented legitimate concerns which the state may counterbal-
98. Brief for Appellee at 11-13.
99. 729 F.2d at 1274.
100. 422 U.S. at 216.
101. 729 F.2d at 1274. In Brandenburg, the Supreme Court held that the constitu-
tional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or pro-
scribe advocacy.., of a violation of law except where such advocacy is directed to incit-
ing or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or promote such action.
395 U.S. at 447.
102. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
103. 729 F.2d at 1274. The Court referred to Erzoznick in discussing employees' need
to restrict their expression to protect their jobs. 422 U.S. at 217.
104. 729 F.2d at 1274. The court specifically held that OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 6-
103.15(A)(2) was the unconstitutionally overbroad portion. Id.
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ance against a teacher's right to freedom of expression. 10 5 The
court of appeals, citing Pickering v. Board of Education,00 ac-
knowledged that a state has interests in regulating the speech of
teachers that differ from its interests in regulating the speech of
the general citizenry, but that these interests outweigh a
teacher's interest only when the expression results in a material
or substantial interference or disruption in the normal activities
of the school. 0 7 Citing to precedent in the Tenth Circuit, the
court held that the defendant school district in the present case
had made no showing that some restriction is necessary to pre-
vent the disruption of official functions or to insure effective
performance by the employee. 10 8
The district court had also cited the balancing test in
Tinker and acknowledged that the statute in question did in-
clude certain activities which are associated with expression.109
However, the court further claimed that engaging in the activi-
ties enumerated in the statute would result in discipline only
where the teacher is found to be unfit. 10 Holding that a teacher
found unfit because of public homosexual activity or conduct
would cause a substantial and material disruption of the school
and that the statute was written primarily to regulate conduct,
the district court held that the restraint of free expression was
105. 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1011.
106. 391 U.S. 563 (1967). In this case the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
support of the dismissal of a teacher for writing and publishing in a newspaper a letter
criticizing the Board of Education's allocation of funds. The Court stated that in any
case involving a State's interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees
the "problem is to arrive at a balance between the interests of a teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interests of the state, as an em-
ployer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employ-
ees." Id. at 568.
107. 729 F.2d at 1274. In weighing the competing interests, the Court referred to
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, in which
the Supreme Court held that where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in
the forbidden conduct would "materially and substantially interfere with the require-
ments of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school" the prohibition cannot be
sustained. 393 U.S. at 509.
108. 729 F.2d at 1274. In Childers v. Independent School District No. 1, 676 F.2d
1338 (10th Cir. 1983), the court of appeals held that under the test devised in Pickering,
an employee's first amendment rights are protected unless the employer shows that some
restriction is necessary to prevent the disruption of official functions or to insure effec-
tive performance by the employee. 676 F.2d at 1341.
109. 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1011.
110. Id.
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merely an ancillary subject of the statute.'11 The district court
claimed that the statute spoke of unfitness rather than disrup-
tion so that a teacher may not be disciplined under this statute
for mere expression unless it materially and substantially inter-
feres with the performance of his duties." 2
The court of appeals differed with the district court's find-
ing of a "material and substantial disruption" test and held that
the unfitness requirement did not save the statute from uncon-
stitutional overbreadth."5 In the listing of factors to be consid-
ered in determining "unfitness,""'4 the court found that the only
factor that was even related to a material or substantial disrup-
tion was an adverse effect upon students or other employees." 5
The court went on to comment that although a material and
substantial disruption is an adverse effect, many adverse effects
are not material and substantial disruptions. "' Because the stat-
ute does not require that the teacher's public utterance occur in
the classroom, the court felt that any public statement that
would come to the attention of school children, their parents, or
school employees might lead to a finding that the statement may
111. Id. at 1012.
112. Id. It was further argued by NGTF in its brief to the Supreme Court that "view-
point-neutral alternatives to the anti-advocacy provisions of the statute are readily avail-
able to the State." For example, NGTF pointed to OkLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 6-103 authoriza-
tion of discharge of any public school teacher who actually incites criminal conduct or
causes disruption in the schools regardless of the substantive content or viewpoint ex-
pressed. Brief for Appellee at 30.
113. 729 F.2d at 1275.
114. Id. The list as enumerated in the statute was: "whether the activity or conduct
is likely to adversely affect students or school employees; whether the activity or conduct
is close in time or place to the teacher's, student teacher's or teachers' aide's official
duties; whether any extenuating or aggravating circumstances exist; and, whether the
conduct or activity is of a repeated or continuing nature which tends to encourage or
dispose school children toward similar conduct or activity." See supra note 4 at (c)(1)-
(4).
115. 729 F.2d at 1275.
116. Id. In its brief to the Supreme Court the Oklahoma City Board of Education
argued that in analyzing factual situations pursuant to Pickering, trial courts have con-
sidered other factors not enumerated'in the general guidelines. They specifically referred
to factors listed in San Diequito Union High School District v. Commission on Profes-
sional Competence, 185 Cal. Rptr. 203, 205 (1982), which included: "(I) Likelihood of
recurrence of the questioned conduct; (2) extenuating or aggravating circumstances; (3)
effect of notoriety or publicity; (4) impairment of student-teacher relationships; (5) dis-
ruption of the educational process; (6) motive; and (7) proximity or remoteness in time
of the conduct." Brief for Appellant at 35.
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"adversely affect" students or school employees. 117 Since the
statute did not specify the weight to be given to any of the listed
factors to be considered, apparently an adverse effect might not
even be a prerequisite to a finding of unfitness.118
Allowing that a statute could be saved from an overbreadth
challenge if it was "readily subject" to a narrowing construction,
the court of appeals held that it was not within its power to con-
strue and narrow state statutes and that therefore the unfitness
requirement did not save the statute from unconstitutional
overbreadth."5
3. Severability
In holding that a portion of the challenged statute was con-
stitutional and a portion was not, the court of appeals was faced
with determining whether the entire statute must be declared
invalid. Relying on the test of severability outlined in Tulsa Ex-
position & Fair Corp. v. Board of County Commissioners,20 the
court of appeals held that those portions of the statute which
deal with "public homosexual conduct" can be severed from the
remainder of the statute without creating a result that the legis-
lature did not intend or contemplate. 21
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the district
court, holding that the statute, insofar as it punishes "homosex-
ual conduct" as defined to include "advocating... encouraging
or promoting public or private homosexual activity," is unconsti-
117. 729 F.2d at 1275.
118. Id.
119. Id. The court relied on Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, ill which the
Supreme Court found that in extrapolating the meaning of the city ordinance in ques-
tion, it was relegated to the words of the ordinance itself, the interpretations the court
below gave to analagous statutes, and, to some degree, the interpretation of the statute
given by those charged with enforcing it. 408 U.S. at 110. NGTF argued to the Supreme
Court that the Oklahoma City Board of Education never argued for abstention in the
courts below and that "failure to raise the possibility of abstention in any lower court
may itself constitute a ground on which this court may decline that option." Brief for the
Appellee at 32.
120. 468 P.2d 501 (Okla. 1970). In this case, the Oklahoma court held that the ques-
tion of severability involved a probe of legislative intent. In voiding a portion of an act,
"if the remaining provisions of the act create a result not intended or contemplated, then
severability cannot be involved." Id. at 507. This is also the test outlined in Hejira Corp.
v. MacFarlane, 660 F.2d 1356, 1362-63 (1974).
121. 729 F.2d at 1275.
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tutional.' 22 The portion of the statute proscribing "homosexual
activity" was found to be constitutional and severable from the
unconstitutional portion.123
B. Dissent
Judge Barrett, in a comparatively long and sharply worded
dissent, stated that he would affirm the district court's finding
that the statute was constitutional on every "front"
challenged.1
2 4
After restating the holding of the majority as it distin-
guished the constitutional and unconstitutional portions of the
statute, Judge Barrett emphasizes that a state has a right within
its police powers to enact regulations in the interest of public
health, safety, morals and welfare over persons within state lim-
its. 25 The dissent found the challenged statute to be an en-
deavor by the State of Oklahoma to protect its school children
and its school employees from any teacher who advocates, solic-
its, encourages or promotes public or private homosexual activ-
ity. 26 The dissent differed with the majority's view of this por-
tion of the statute, finding that the proscribed activity is
"pinpointed as the commission of the unnatural and detestable
act of sodomy.'
2 7
The dissent reviewed the Oklahoma statute entitled "Crime
against nature' 28 and provided case precedent for holding that
the statute challenged in the instant case is not unconstitution-
ally vague.12 9 In its decision, the majority had also held that the
portion of the statute proscribing public homosexual activity
was constitutional. 30 The dissent emphasized that the State of





127. Id. at 1275-76. The dissent finds that "public homosexual activity" by specific
reference to the Oklahoma criminal code is distinctly defined as "the unnatural, per-
verse, detestable and abominable act of sodomy." Id.
128. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 provides: "Every person who is guilty of the detestable
and abominable crime against nature, committed with mankind or with a beast, is pun-
ishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding ten years."
129. 729 F.2d at 1276. The dissent stated that the terms convey an "adequate
description of the prohibited act or conduct to persons of ordinary understanding." Id.
130. Id. at 1273.
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Oklahoma clearly announced that sodomy is not to be counte-
nanced within its borders and that federal courts should not
function as super-legislatures in judging the wisdom or desirabil-
ity of legislation that neither affects fundamental rights nor pro-
ceeds along suspect lines.1"1 The dissent relied upon City of New
Orleans v. Duke"3 2 for Supreme Court support of this posi-
tion. " ' However, it should be noted that the Duke case involved
a challenge to a local economic regulation in which the Supreme
Court afforded wide latitude to states in the regulation of local
economies under the state's police power.134 The Supreme Court
in Duke further distinguished such economic regulations from a
classification which would trammel "fundamental personal
rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as
race, religion or alienage." 3 5
The dissent cited Wainwright v. Stone'3 6 to show that the
Supreme Court has held that other states' "crime against na-
ture" statutes have been subject to narrowing construction. 3 '
This construction held that the "crime against nature" included
oral and anal intercourse. 33 However, this was not contested by
the majority opinion. In upholding that portion of the statute
proscribing "public homosexual activity," the majority agreed
that Oklahoma state court decisions had clearly defined the
"crime against nature.' ' 3 9
By restating the definition and the interpretation of the
"crime against nature" statute, Judge Barrett provided support
for his principle disagreement with the majority's holding that
131. Id. at 1276.
132. 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (a New Orleans ordinance prohibiting pushcart food sales in
the French Quarter did not violate equal protection, even though a "grandfather provi-
sion" exempted vendors who had operated in the quarter for eight years.)
133. 729 F.2d at 1276.
134. Id.
135. 427 U.S. at 303. The Supreme Court further stated, and upon this the dissent
relies, that "the judiciary may not sit as a super-legislature to judge the wisdom or desir-
ability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental
rights nor proceed along suspect lines." Id.
136. 414 U.S. 21 (1973).
137. 729 F.2d at 1276.
138. 414 U.S. at 22 ("the Florida statutory provision proscribing 'the abominable and
detestable crime against nature,'. . . in light of the State Supreme Court's longstanding
construction as applying to copulation per os and per anum, was not unconstitutionally
vague").
139. 729 F.2d at 1273.
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the "public homosexual conduct" portion of the statute is over-
broad. 40 The dissent's disagreement with the majority is based
on an interpretation that the sodomy law is not vague. In the
dissent's opinion, "Sodomy is malum in se, i.e. immoral and cor-
ruptible in its nature without regard to its being noticed or pun-
ished by the law of the state.""'
In presenting his dissent, Judge Barrett substitutes the
word "sodomy" for the phrase "public homosexual conduct" in
the challenged statute and states that advocating, soliciting, en-
couraging or promoting the act of sodomy "is in fact and in
truth 'inciting' school children to participate in the abominable
and detestable crime against nature."" 2 In his view, this does
not merit constitutional protection."" The dissent finds that a
teacher advocating the practice of sodomy to school children is
without first amendment protection, and that "the statute fur-
thers a substantial government interest, as determined by the
Oklahoma legislature, unrelated to the suppression of free
speech. The incidental restriction of alleged first amendment
freedom is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.""'
After stating that a teacher who advocates, solicits, encour-
ages or promotes "public homosexual conduct" is without first
amendment protection, the dissent rejects the majority's appli-
cation of Tinker.' 45 The dissent agrees that political expression
and association is at the very heart of the first amendment, but
distinguishes Tinker as involving a symbolic demonstration of
national political significance and the advocacy of "public homo-
sexual conduct" not qualifying as political expression.' 4 The
dissent stated that there is no need to establish that the advo-
cacy will interfere in school activities because it is sufficient that
there is a risk that such conduct will encourage school children
140. Id. at 1276.
141. The dissent distinguished this from the conduct or activity not being malum





145. Id. at 1276-77, see supra note 37.
146. 729 F.2d at 1277. The dissent did not refer to "public homosexual conduct" but
to the "advocacy of a practice as universally condemned as the crime of sodomy." Id.
19851
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to commit the "abominable crime against nature."'47 The dis-
sent cited for support of this argument the Supreme Court's
statement in Tinker,4 8 which requires the application of first
amendment rights "in light of the special circumstances of the
... environment" in the particular case.'
4 9
The majority, in relying on Tinker, held that the proscrip-
tion of "public homosexual conduct" was a restriction of
speech.'50 The dissent found that equating "public homosexual
conduct" to the situation in Tinker is a "bow to permissive-
ness."'"' The dissent also distinguished the advocacy issue in
this case from the advocacy in Brandenburg v. Ohio.'5 The dis-
sent stated that in Brandenburg the protected speech involved
the advocacy of violence, sabotage and terrorism.'53 This speech
was protected because it did not involve the advocacy of a crime
malum in se to school children by a school teacher.15 4
In finding that the challenged statute was overbroad, the
majority followed the facial challenge requirements as outlined
in Broadrick v. Oklahoma'55 and found them applicable in the
present case because the challenged statute was not "subject to
narrowing construction" and had a "real and substantial ef-
147. Id.
148. 393 U.S. 503.
149. Id. at 506. The full quote is: "First Amendment rights, applied in light of the
special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students."
150. 729 F.2d at 1274. In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that a school can interfere
with speech only where there is proof that the speech "would materially and substan-
tially interfere with the requirement of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school." 393 U.S. at 509. Tinker also held that the Constitution requires that we must
take the risk that "any word spoken, that deviates from the views of another person, may
start an argument, cause a disturbance, inspire fear or cause trouble. Undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression." Id. at 508.
151. 729 F.2d at 1277.
152. 395 U.S. 444.
153. 729 F.2d at 1277.
154. Id.
155. 413 U.S. 601. The Supreme Court stated that "any enforcement of a statute thus
placed at issue is totally forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or partial
invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitution-
ally protected expression. Application of the overbreadth doctrine in this manner is,
manifestly, strong medicine. It has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a
last resort. Facial overbreadth has not been invoked when a limiting construction has
been or could be placed on the challenged statute." Id. at 613.
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fect."' " The dissent also cites Broadrick in reviewing the stat-
ute,1"" and states that a broadly worded statute which does deter
some protected speech or conduct may not require invalidation
if that deterrence can justify such action.158 The dissent applies
the guidelines set down by the Supreme Court in Keyishian v.
Board of Regents " for determining when deterrence of speech
or conduct does, or does not, justify invalidation of a statute.6 0
The dissent suggests that in the context of the Oklahoma public
school system, the advocacy of sodomy by a teacher in a manner
"that creates a substantial risk" that it will come to the atten-
tion of school children deserves no first amendment
protection.1 61
The dissent states that the Supreme Court in Keyishian
drew a distinction between speech or conduct advocating an ab-
stract doctrine or belief, which demands constitutional protec-
tion and advocacy of unlawful action or acts with the intent to
incite, which deserves no such protection.' 3" The dissent finds
that there is "nothing abstract" about a teacher advocating to
school children the "crime against nature."1 63 The dissent inter-
prets the expression proscribed by the statute as the advocacy of
the commission of sodomy and, as such, this cannot be advocacy
of an abstract doctrine or belief.1
6 4
The dissent does not discuss the possible advocacy of any-
thing other than the commission of the act of sodomy. The dis-
sent fails to take into account the plaintiff's concerns regarding
the punishment of teachers, contained in the statute, for the ad-
vocacy of civil rights for homosexual persons, or the expression
of opinions on homosexuality in both public and private. And,
unlike the district court,165 the dissent does not find that it is
156. 729 F.2d at 1274.
157. Id. at 1277.
158. Id. The dissent cites 413 U.S. at 615.
159. 385 U.S. 589 (1967), in which the Supreme Court held that a provision is plainly
susceptible of sweeping and improper application if it prohibits the employment of one
who merely advocates the doctrine in the abstract without any attempt to indoctrinate
others, or incites others to action in furtherance of unlawful aims. Id. at 599-600.





165. 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1017, supra note 30.
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unreasonable for the plaintiff to fear punishment for these types
of action.
IV. SUPREME COURT
In a decision announced on March 26, 1985, without a writ-
ten opinion,1 e6 the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals by an equally divided Court. 6 ' The 4-4 vote of
the Court automatically affirms the judgment of the court of ap-
peals in the case brought on appeal but does not serve as prece-
dent for other cases. 1
68
V. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma by
holding that Oklahoma statute Title 70, § 6-103.15, insofar as it
provides for the dismissal or suspension of public school teach-
ers for "public homosexual conduct" as defined in the statute to
include "advocating ... encouraging or promoting public or pri-
vate homosexual activity," is unconstitutional.16 9
In so deciding, the court of appeals also held that there was
no constitutional problem in the dismissal or suspension of
teachers for "public homosexual activity.'1 70 Additionally, the
court held that the statute's definition of "public homosexual ac-
tivity" was not unconstitutionally vague nor did the statute vio-
late the right to privacy or equal protection.'
The statute's unconstitutional prohibition of "public homo-
sexual conduct," as it included advocacy of homosexual activity,
was held to be severable from those portions of the statute
which were found to be constitutional.17 2 By severing the "con-
duct" portion of the statute, the court of appeals limited its re-
166. Board of Education of the City of Oklahoma City v. National Gay Task Force,
105 S. Ct. 1858.
167. Id. Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this case.
168. The Supreme Court affirmance means that the states within the 10th Circuit
-Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming-are bound by the
court of appeals decision in this case.
169. 729 F.2d at 1275.
170. Id. at 1273.
171. See supra notes 49 & 61 and accompanying text.
172. Supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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versal of the district court decision and its finding of unconstitu-
tionality to the statute's prohibition of protected speech.""
Unlike the district court in Baker v. Wade,1 74 this court did not
find that the challenged statute infringed upon the right to
privacy.
17 5
The severance of the "speech" portions of the statute leaves
unanswered questions regarding the alleged vagueness of the
term "public homosexual activity." The court of appeals ac-
cepted the statute's, and thus the Oklahoma legislature's, defini-
tion of the term as the "performance of certain sexual acts
which are indiscreet and not in private. 1 76 But, what conduct is
to be regarded as both private and discreet by Oklahoma school
officials? For example, can an otherwise private act become in-
discreet simply because someone else learns of it?
The National Gay Task Force brought the original action in
the district court challenging the facial validity of the statute on
a number of grounds.1 77 When the district court held that NGTF
had failed to demonstrate that the statute was unconstitutional
on all the grounds presented, NGTF brought an appeal to the
circuit court of appeals on the same original grounds.178 As has
been discussed, the court of appeals agreed with most of the dis-
trict court's decision except that portion which provided punish-
ment for mere advocacy of homosexuality.
1 79
The Oklahoma City Board of Education appealed the court
of appeals decision that this portion of the statute was unconsti-
tutional. 180 NGTF did not appeal the court of appeals holding
on the other contentions. Thus, on the appeal to the Supreme
173. Supra note 122 and accompanying text.
174. 553 F. Supp. 1121. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas held that:
The right of privacy does extend to private, voluntary, intimate relation-
ships-between husband and wife, between unmarried males and females, be-
tween homosexuals. Accordingly, homosexual conduct in private between con-
senting adults is protected by a fundamental right of privacy. Any state
restriction upon that right must be justified by some compelling state interest.
Id. at 1141.
175. 729 F.2d at 1273.
176. OKLA. STAT. TIT. 70, § 6-103.15(A)(1)(b). See supra note 4.
177. Supra note 21 and accompanying text.
178. Supra note 33 and accompanying text.
179. Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
180. Supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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Court, the constitutional inquiry was narrowly limited to ques-
tions that involved only speech, not conduct.' The appeal was
limited to the constitutionality of that portion of the statute
which allows a school district to dismiss or suspend a teacher for
"advocating... encouraging, or promoting public or private ho-
mosexual activity in a manner that creates a substantial risk
that such conduct will come to the attention of school children
or school employees."'
82
The portion of the statute which the court of appeals found
to be unconstitutional concerns first amendment violations of
teachers' right to free speech. 8 The court applied the balancing
test analysis of a restriction of teachers' speech as outlined by
the Supreme Court in both Pickering'" and in Tinker"8 " and
found that the state's interests did not outweigh the teachers'
interest.'86 And, in holding that the statute's proscription of ad-
vocacy was unconstitutional, 187 the court of appeals followed the
analysis of "advocacy" as defined in the Supreme Court deci-
sions in Brandenburg'"8 and in Hess."8 9 Professor Tribe in his
argument for NGTF before the Supreme Court again stressed
this point.190
The dissent in the court of appeals decision disagreed with
the majority's analysis and its application of case law.' By ap-
plying what appeared to be a "natural law" test to the statute,
the dissent distinguished the proscribed activity as malum in se,
unlike the protected actions in the cited Supreme Court deci-
sions which the dissent characterized as merely malum prohib-
181. 53 U.S.L.W. at 3204. (The questions presented were: (1) Does [the] state statute
on its face unconstitutionally infringe upon protected free speech rights of public school
teachers? (2) Is [the]statute so facially overbroad as to infringe upon the protected free
speech rights of public school teachers? (3) Can [the] statute be so narrowly construed as
to uphold its constitutionality?) Id.
182. See supra note 85.
183. Supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
184. Supra note 106.
185. Supra note 107.
186. Supra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
187. Supra note 119 and accompanying text.
188. Supra note 94.
189. Supra note 95.
190. Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. National Gay Task Force, 53 U.S.L.W.
3521, 3522, Summary of oral arguments.
191. Supra notes 129-39, 145-52, 155-62 and accompanying text.
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itum. 192 In a similar spirit, the Oklahoma City Board of Educa-
tion, in its argument to the Supreme Court, suggested that a
teacher's advocacy of homosexuality would be a threat to stu-
dent morality. 193
The Supreme Court's 4-4 per curiam affirmance of the court
of appeals' decision provided no clear cut victory for either side.
Because of the tie vote, the lower court's ruling remains in place
but only applies to the states in the Tenth Circuit.9 4 And, be-
cause there was no written opinion in the decision, it is not clear
how each of the Justices voted.
The summary of the oral arguments suggest that a number
of the Justices were concerned about the statute's constitution-
ality within the first amendment, but there was also concern ex-
pressed about issues of standing and the lack of a state court
interpretation of the statute. 95 The Board of Education had
taken the position that the court of appeals should have waited
until a state court had construed the statute.'9 6 NGTF argued
that if the decision had been deferred to the state courts it
would create a period of uncertainty as to what the statute actu-
ally prohibited.
97
The Supreme Court, up until this case and time, has been
reluctant to address first amendment rights as they may extend
to gay people. As recently as April 1, 1985, in Gay Student Ser-
vices v. Texas A&M University,'98 the Supreme Court dismissed
the appeal of Texas A&M and denied the alternative petition for
certiorari. 99 The dismissal leaves intact the decision of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals,00 which had reversed the lower court
decision, which upheld the University's decision not to recognize
the group.201 Again, the Supreme Court has side-stepped the is-
sue of the legal rights of gay people.
192. Supra note 141.
193. 53 U.S.L.W. at 3521.
194. Supra note 168 and accompanying text.
195. 53 U.S.L.W. at 3521.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 53 U.S.L.W. 3702 (U.S. April 2, 1985) (No. 84-724).
199. Id.
200. 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984).
201. Id. at 1334.
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Notwithstanding that the result in the Oklahoma case was
not a precedent setting decision, it has been seen as an impor-
tant case for the homosexual rights community and a significant
step in the gay and lesbian community's struggle for equal
rights.202 As Professor Tribe stated in his oral argument to the
Supreme Court: "The modern struggle for homosexual rights is
truly a struggle for civil rights. The question is how open should
debate be."2 08
The result in this case is important even though the Su-
preme Court issued the decision without an opinion. The tie
vote shows that four members of the Court viewed the
Oklahoma law as an unconstitutional infringement of the free-
dom of speech. It is also significant in that it was the first time
that the Supreme Court had done something positive for the gay
community.
Sooner or later the Supreme Court will have to face the is-
sue of the rights extended to homosexuals in the Constitution.
By its 4-4 affirmance in this case, the Supreme Court has not
made it clear that gay people are entitled to all the rights and
privileges that everyone else enjoys. Supreme Court action in
this area will be required if gay men and lesbians are going to be
guaranteed their constitutional rights. Anti-gay sentiment is
widespread in this country and in the absence of a change in the
attitude of legislators, as evidenced by the passage of new legis-
lation by the Oklahoma House of Representatives attempting to
put the anti-gay teacher statute back on the books,"" the Su-
preme Court will have to make a definitive ruling on a homosex-
ual rights case before the lesbian and gay community in this
country can be assured that it is guaranteed equal treatment
under the law.
Thomas J. Burrows
202. See L.A. Times, Mar. 29, 1985 at 6 Part II, col. 1.; L.A. Times, Mar. 27, 1985, at
10 Part I, col. 1; Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1985 at 10 col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1985 at A23
col. 1.
203. 53 U.S.L.W. at 3522.
204. On May 17, 1985 the Oklahoma house passed by a 94-0 vote a bill that changed
the wording of the law. The Governor signed this law on July 24. The new law refers
neither to homosexuality nor to advocacy; "it refers only to the 'soliciting' or 'imposing'
of 'criminal sexual activity' and only to such behavior that is directed toward a student,
that occurs during school or school-related activities, or that impedes the teacher's effec-
tiveness." News Briefs, The Advocate, September 3, 1983, at 29, col. 1.
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